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G21Weexamine the predilection for private bonds over bankﬁnancing (debt structure) for emergingmarketswithin
the frameworks of both transaction cost economics and a transparency explanation, emphasizing the distinction
between public monitoring (bonds) and private monitoring (banks), as well as considering the inﬂuence of na-
tional culture on institutions. Employing several tests, including structural equation modeling, we ﬁnd, among
many results that in emergingmarkets bonds are preferred over bank loans when there is less corporate opacity
and fewer foreign access restrictions, as well as in environment of greater political instability, transaction cost,
and limits to legal protection. Bonds are also favored over banks in cultural environments of greater uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence and less individualism. Overall, we attribute our
results to culture and institutional quality together inﬂuencing debt structure, particularly by impacting attitudes
toward public monitoring. Our results will be of great interest to researchers interested in the legal, social, and
cultural environments of emerging markets.
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Recent research has investigated the determinants of bank versus
market ﬁnancing (ﬁnancial structure). For instance, Aggarwal and
Goodell (2009a), Aggarwal and Goodell (2009b), Ergungor (2004),
and Kwok and Tadesse (2006), among others, look at governance and
culture as determinants of ﬁnancial structure. However, less research
has been carried out on the determinants of bond versus bank ﬁnancing
(debt structure), especially in the context of emerging markets.
The literature on stock market ﬁnancing versus bank ﬁnancing is
only partially applicable to understanding why some societies prefer
to obtain loans through relationship ﬁnancing rather than bonds. For in-
stance, examining stockmarketﬁnancing versus bank ﬁnancing ignores
the impact of leverage on ﬁnancing choices, whereas focusing only on
the debt component avoids this problem. Further, most research on
bank versus stock market ﬁnancing has focused on the transaction
costs of market ﬁnancing (Williamson, 1998) and the concomitant
costs of resolving the asymmetric information of contracts (Hart, 2001).
However, bond versus bank ﬁnancing, while also inﬂuenced by
transactions costs, reveals the important and intriguing issue of the, agoyal@liv.ac.uk (A. Goyal).
al, A.,What determines debt s
17), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016public monitoring of bonds through ratings agencies versus the private
monitoring of banks. The issue of transparency is therefore additionally
important to the issue of bonds versus banks. Past research has also
found that, under ﬁnancial distress, ﬁrms prefer bank ﬁnancing to
bond ﬁnancing (Chemmanur & Fulghieri, 1994). It is reasonable to con-
sider that ﬁrms' attitude toward public versus private monitoring is in-
ﬂuenced by their respective ﬁnancial health.
However, past research on debt structure has not focused on emerg-
ing markets while comprehensively controlling for institutional quality
and national culture. In this paper, we draw upon the recent compre-
hensive dimensioning of emergingmarket institutional quality outlined
by Karolyi (2015). We also investigate national culture as a determi-
nant, employing the complete set of six cultural dimensions of
Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov (2010). We consider that national cul-
ture and institutions are related, with institutional quality and nature is
likely shaped by culture. We reﬂect on this concern in our paper by in-
cluding the results of structural equation modeling.
For our sample period of 2000–2013 for 21 emerging-market coun-
tries, we examine the predilection for private bonds over bankﬁnancing
(debt structure) within the frameworks of both transaction cost eco-
nomics and a transparency explanation, emphasizing the distinction be-
tween publicmonitoring (bonds) and privatemonitoring (banks)while
simultaneously considering the inﬂuence of culture on the institutions.tructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
1 We conduct additional empirical analysis by using the approximate PCA scores from
radio-graphs published on the author's webpage (http://www.emergingmarketsenigma.
com/data/). Our results are qualitatively similar, and statistically consistentwith published
rankings and available from the authors upon request.
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we ﬁnd, among many results, that in emerging markets, bonds are pre-
ferred over banks when there are less corporate opacity and fewer for-
eign access restrictions, as well as in environments of greater political
instability, transactions costs, and limits to legal protection. Bonds are
also favored over banks in cultural environments of greater uncertainty
avoidance, masculinity, long-term orientation, and indulgence and less
individualism. Overall we interpret our results as suggestive of a prefer-
ence for bonds over banks, and is impeded by a predilection formore in-
dividualistic and less uncertainty-avoiding cultures to self-monitor, but
encouraged by gaps in governance that lower the consequences of
public monitoring. Our results will be of great interest to researchers
interested in the legal, social, and culture environments of emerging
markets.
2. Background
2.1. Determinants of banks versus bonds
As observed by Tanaka (2005), a fundamental distinction between
bond ﬁnancing and bank lending is that banks act as private monitors
and keep the assessments of borrowers private. This is in contrast to rat-
ings agencies acting as public monitors. Therefore, ﬁrms not wanting
unfavorable aspects to be public will prefer bank ﬁnancing over bond ﬁ-
nancing. Contrarily, with bonds, private rating agencies act as public
monitors. Unfavorable aspects can include the danger of ﬁnancial dis-
tress, so it is reasonable to consider that ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress will
prefer bank ﬁnancing to bond ﬁnancing. Chemmanur and Fulghieri
(1994) afﬁrm that banks are favored by ﬁrms in ﬁnancial distress, but
from a different angle. The authors argue that banks have an incentive
tomake correct renegotiation decisions to enhance reputational capital.
In what appears to be a contrasting point of view, De Fiore and Uhlig
(2005) theoretically model that banks are more favored over bonds in
Europe in contrast to the United States because of lower levels of infor-
mation about creditworthiness. Amonitoring explanation of debt struc-
ture could assume the opposite i.e. in environments of lower credible
information, it could be safer for ﬁrms to expose themselves to public
monitoring. However, it could be argued that banks are not just a pri-
vatemonitor but a bettermonitor, largely because they have a larger in-
formation set than just public information (Diamond, 1984; Fama,
1985). Diamond (1991) ﬁnds the choice between bank loans and pri-
vate debt to be driven by both comfort with being monitored and ﬁrm
reputation. Yosha (1995) ﬁnds that ﬁrms with more sensitive informa-
tion prefer bank debt. Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999)ﬁnd that
banks are more valuable as private monitors when information asym-
metry is severe. They proxy information asymmetry between a ﬁrm
and lenders as the residual volatility in the ﬁrm's stock returns. Denis
and Mihov (2003), however, measure information asymmetry by the
ratio of research and development expenses to sales and ﬁnd no signif-
icance for this variable.
Boot and Thakor (1997) assert that the role and usage of banks ver-
sus bonds – or any sort of market ﬁnancing – have much to do with
primitive and initial endowments that have shaped attitudes and insti-
tutional evolution. The authors note uncertainties not just with regard
to assessing ﬁrm value but also with regard to the moral hazard of
ﬁrms that inﬂuence choices to the detriment of creditors. Much also
has to do with howmuch stake in the game banks are allowed to have.
To fully explore all aspects of why in particular societies, banks or
bonds are more favored could potentially involve examining a multi-
tude of factors, including individual country laws on banking, the nature
of the businesses of ﬁrms, and so forth. However, in this study of emerg-
ing market countries, using a new comprehensive set of institutional
characteristics for emerging markets and the complete set of national
cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010), we present empirical re-
sults that explain a large part of the country-level variance in bank ver-
sus bond ﬁnancing. We ﬁnd overall institutional and cultural qualitiesPlease cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016dominate with regard to this choice of ﬁnancial structure for emerging
markets. Overall, we interpret our results as suggesting that a prefer-
ence for bonds over banks is impeded by a predilection for more indi-
vidualistic and less uncertainty-avoiding cultures to self-monitor, but
are encouraged by gaps in governance that lower the consequences of
public monitoring.
2.2. Institutions and debt structure
To capture the institutional quality of each emerging market,
we employ six emergingmarket dimensions of Karolyi (2015): 1) mar-
ket capacity constraints (POOR_CAPACITY), 2) operational inefﬁciencies
(POOR_OPERATION), 3) foreign accessibility restrictions (FOREIGN_
RESTRICTIONS), 4) corporate opacity (CORPORATE_OPACITY), 5) limits
on legal protection (POOR_LEGAL), and 6) political instability
(POLITICAL_UNSTABLE).
Market capacity constraints concern the scope and breadth of capital
markets, including the capitalization of equity markets, the size of bond
markets, and the number and turnover of listed companies on the stock
market. Operational inefﬁciencies regard the costs of transactions, such
as the broker commission, fees paid to exchanges, investment taxes,
stringent trading rules, and issues of liquidity. Foreign accessibility re-
strictions involve the liberalization of capital ﬂow and their regulation,
both de jure and de facto. These include de jure registration require-
ments, ownership restrictions, and foreign capital gains tax, among
others. De facto measures include the investment rations of the Stan-
dard & Poor's (S&P) EmergingMarkets database, size of the ADRmarket
(Doidge, Karolyi, & Stulz, 2009), total external assets and liabilities to
the gross domestic product (GDP), and the ratios of the external portfo-
lio and direct equity to the GDP (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2001).
Corporate opacity regards standards for corporate reporting and cor-
porate governance, including such measures as the transparency scores
of Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith (2004), the S&P transparency scores,
and the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research ac-
counting standards among others. Limits on legal protection regard
limits on the legal protections afforded to investors. These include the
measures of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998),
such as the judicial efﬁciency, rule of law, and creditor rights indices;
the formalism index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer
(2003); the anti–self-dealing index of Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silvanes, and Shleifer (2008); as well as measures from the World
Bank's Doing Business series. Political instability concerns measures
country-level political governance i.e. World Bank governance indica-
tors, Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom, and Corruption
Perceptions Index of Transparency International. This variable also in-
corporates measures of democratic character of the respective polity.
These measures include the fractionalization of political power from
the World Bank database of political institutions, the proportionality
index of Pagano and Volpin (2006), the Polity IV index, and the political
constraints index of Henisz (2000).
The components mentioned above for each emerging market di-
mension are but a subset of the complete set of factors included by
Karolyi (2015), whose factors also include proprietary non-public mea-
sures. Karolyi (2015) aggregates the separate components for each di-
mension of emerging market inefﬁciency into a single country-level
score with principal component analysis approach. While the author
does not publish the ﬁnal scores for these dimensions, for this paper
we follow the published rankings.1We rank the countries in our sample
according to their order as presented by Karolyi (2015). With 21 coun-
tries in our sample,we derive scores for each dimension as 22minus thetructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
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country-level situation for the respective dimension. Overall, we feel
that using Karolyi (2015) dimensions affords systematic and complete
control of the institutional environment of the emerging markets in
our sample.
To assess the impact of culture on debt structure, we include as inde-
pendent variables the six cultural dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010):
uncertainty avoidance (UAI), individualism versus collectivism (IDV),
power distance (PDI), masculinity or gender differentiation (MAS), in-
dulgence versus restraint (IVR), and long-term orientation (LTOWVS).2
We note that the national culture dimensions of Hofstede (1980) and
Hofstede et al. (2010) have been implicitly endorsed by their inclusion
in hundreds of research studies (Kirkman, Lowe, & Gibson, 2006). Cul-
ture has been shown to impact transaction costs (Aggarwal & Goodell,
2009a; Kwok & Tadesse, 2006). Regarding monitoring, Gray (1988),
and Aggarwal and Goodell (2015) evidence an association of culture
with transparency.2.2.1. Institutions, transactions costs, and debt structure
Related to the public versus private monitoring dichotomy of bonds
versus banks, it has been recognized, at least since Akerlof (1970), that
asymmetric information creates a cost to market transactions in the ag-
gregate. Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) echo this notion, noting that the
costs of information collection are a key component of market transac-
tions. Therefore, the nature of monitoring has important implications
forﬁnancial systems. According toNorth (1990), the costliness of the in-
formation needed for the measurement and enforcement of exchanges
creates transaction costs. As noted by Williamson (1988) and many
others (e.g., Hart, 2001), the primary transactions costs of market ex-
changes stem from asymmetric information and the uncertainties of
contracts.
Transaction cost economics suggest that the overall cost of market
exchange have a signiﬁcant impact on respective ﬁnancial systems
(Williamson, 1975). This point has been heavily emphasized in articles
examining the predilection for stockmarket ﬁnancing over bank ﬁnanc-
ing. For example, Aggarwal and Goodell (2009a), Ergungor (2004), and
Kwok and Tadesse (2006) suggests either explicitly or implicitly that
the choice of stock market ﬁnancing over bank ﬁnancing is inﬂuenced
strongly by differences in transaction costs across nations, with these
transaction costs primarily being costs associatedwithmarket contracts
that are not present in relationship ﬁnancing. Ergungor (2004), in par-
ticular, ﬁnds markets are favored over banks in environments of a com-
mon law or English legal origin. This echoes the legal origin theory of La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997), which suggests
greater investor protection under common law than civil law. When
there is greater legal protection for investors, there are lower transac-
tion costs of resolving the asymmetries of information inherent in mar-
ket contracts. This is because, in environments of better legal protection,
there are lesser ultimate consequences of violations of social trust. In
this study, we include Karolyi's (2015) six dimensions of institutional
quality.
Two of these dimensions, the degree of limits on legal protection and
the degree of political instability, reﬂect cross-national differences in the
ability of institutions to protect investors. Limits on legal protection di-
rectly lower investor protection. Instability of the polity also under-
mines legal guarantees. So, from a transaction cost point of view, we
expect limits to legal protection and political instability to be signiﬁ-
cantly negatively associatedwith debt structure. Similarly, other institu-
tional variables associated with increased transactions costs will, from a
transactional cost perspective are expected to have a negative associa-
tion with debt structure.2 To improve sample sizes, Hofstede et al. (2010) employ the World Values Survey to
assist in forming their estimates of this last cultural dimension.
Please cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
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In the previous section, we brieﬂy introduce the role of institutional
quality in shaping transaction costs, which, in turn, shapes debt struc-
ture. However, in this section we also consider the role of institutions
in shaping debt structure by impacting the costs and beneﬁts of public
versus private monitoring. We consider that, particularly in countries
with lower levels of institutional development, that limits to legal pro-
tection and instability of the polity can contribute to an overall institu-
tional environment in which ﬁrms may be more comfortable with
being publicly monitored. In environments of weak governance there
are lesser consequences to unfavorable public monitoring.
Of course, the notion that weak investor protection and weak polit-
ical institutions could, under some circumstances, encourage private
bond market development as an alternative to banks, runs counter to
thewidespread belief that institutional development and capitalmarket
development go hand in hand. Many papers (e.g., Acemoglu & Johnson,
2005; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Beck & Levine, 2005; Claessens &
Laeven, 2003)ﬁnd evidence or posit a positive association of institution-
al development and capital market development. However, whether
the private bond markets of emerging market countries differ from
those of developed countries should at least be considered. For instance,
Laeven (2014) notes that, while the private bondmarkets ofmoderately
wealthier countries have grown considerably over recent decades, this
has not necessarily been true for the private bond markets of lower-
income countries.
Other expected relations between institutional quality and comfort
with private monitoring include expecting a negative signiﬁcance of
bonds over banks with greater corporate opacity. We expect corporate
opacity to be consistent with an environment antagonistic to
monitoring.
2.3. National culture and debt structure
National culture is increasingly investigated as a possible determi-
nant of ﬁnancial outcomes (Aggarwal & Goodell, 2014). In this section,
we brieﬂy outline two channels that can impact debt structure. Culture
inﬂuences behavior through either 1) directly inﬂuencing transactions
costs by inﬂuencing conﬁdence, toleration of ambiguity, or other quali-
ties or 2) directly inﬂuencing a predilection for transparency and com-
fort with public monitoring.
2.3.1. National culture, transaction costs, and debt structure
Aggarwal and Goodell (2009a) and Kwok and Tadesse (2006) em-
phasize the role of national culture in determining nations' predilection
for stock market ﬁnancing versus bank ﬁnancing. Their arguments are
along the lines of the transaction cost being used to resolve the asym-
metric information of contracts, thereby depressing market ﬁnancing
in favor of bank ﬁnancing. Of particular interest is uncertainty avoid-
ance. Empirical results for studies investigating ﬁnancing choices ﬁnd
nations higher in uncertainty avoidance favor bank ﬁnancing over
stockmarkets. Other cultural variables too play a potential role with re-
gard to transaction costs. For instance, individualism has been associat-
edwith enhanced conﬁdence (Chui, Titman, &Wei, 2010). By extension,
conﬁdence lowers transaction costs by reducing the impetus for costly
information gathering. In a similar vein, masculinity has also been
linked to enhanced assertiveness (Hofstede et al., 2010). Alternatively,
power distance and other forms of social fractionalization have been
linked to greater transaction costs. We consider that a long-term orien-
tation engenders trust and thus lowers transaction costs (Hagen&Choe,
1998). We suggest indulgence versus restraint could also reduce trans-
action costs by establishing a looser andmore relaxed approach to deci-
sion making.
2.3.2. National culture, monitoring, and debt structure
In the previous section, we brieﬂy introduced the role of national
culture in shaping transaction costs, which in turn shapes debttructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
3 We also estimate the results for the same sets of independent variables in Table 5, al-
ternatively using random effect regressionmodels. The results are qualitatively and quan-
titatively similar to those currently reported for the OLS model in Table 5. The results for
the random effect regression are not reported here in the interest of brevity but are avail-
able upon request from the authors.
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shaping debt structure by impacting the costs and beneﬁts of public ver-
sus private monitoring. Culture emerges from an economically and so-
cially optimizing process that aggregates behavioral traits. The traits
that prove to be economically and socially optimizing survive and
then become the basis for a society's culture. As an extension, much
prior literature has documented that culture affects economic actions
and ﬁnancial decision making (Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2006).
Highly individualistic cultures focus on the self, not others. With re-
gard to individualism, we note literature associating individualismwith
a need to sustain self-construal and more self-monitoring (Gudykunst
et al., 1989; Trubisky, Ting-Toomey, & Lin, 1991). Self-monitoring
refers to the ability for expressive control to regulate behavior to accom-
modate differing social circumstances. Those who engage in self-
monitoring adjust their self-presentation in response to perceptions re-
garding a particular audience or occasion. This is to ensure an appropri-
ate appearance. Individuals and societies differ substantially in their
abilities and desires to engage in expressive control. Self-monitors try
to understand how individuals and groups will perceive their actions.
Some personality types commonly act spontaneously, while others are
more apt to purposely control and consciously adjust their behavior.
Individualist cultures prefer the ability to self-monitor rather than stan-
dards of public monitoring. Therefore, from a monitoring perspective,
we expect a negative association between individualism and debt struc-
ture.We acknowledge that this is in contrast to our expectation of a pos-
itive association based on a transaction cost perspective.
We note that low uncertainty avoidance is concomitant with fewer
rules and norms governing behavior than in high uncertainty-avoiding
cultures. Higher uncertainty avoidance is associated with greater intol-
erance of deviant behavior (Gudykunst & Lee, 2003). We consider such
a lack of tolerance for ambiguity to favor a greater predilection for
accepting public monitoring. Therefore, based on amonitoring perspec-
tive, we expect a positive association between uncertainty avoidance
and debt structure. We note that this is in contrast to our expectation
of a negative association based on a transaction cost perspective.
From a monitoring perspective, we expect power distance to have a
negative associationwith debt structure. Greater social hierarchy encour-
ages the restriction of information to exclusive groups (Gray, 1988;
Hofstede et al., 2010). With regard to masculinity, we could expect,
from amonitoring perspective, a positive associationwith debt structure.
Hofstede et al. (2010) and others note thatmasculinity is associatedwith
public competition. However, Hofstede (2003) also notes that the com-
petition ensuing from masculinity can lead to lying and the distortion
of truth, in which case there would be a negative association between
transparency and masculinity. In sum, the nature of the association be-
tween masculinity and the willingness to be monitored is ambiguous.
We expect, from a monitoring perspective, a positive association be-
tween debt structure and long-term orientation. Greater long-term ori-
entation lessens the need for obfuscation to favorably shape short-term
public disclosures (Koller, Goedhart, &Wessels, 2005).With regard to in-
dulgence versus restraint, from a monitoring perspective, we expect a
positive association with debt structure. This is because Hofstede et al.
(2010) and others associate indulgence versus restraint, with a greater
predilection for free speech and public declaration of viewpoints.
2.4. Debt structure, institutions, and culture
In the preceding sections, we outline two channels of determination
for debt structure: One is a transaction costs approach, wherein greater
transaction costs, either institutionally or culturally driven, act to favor
banks over bonds. The other channel is a monitoring perspective,
wherein bondswill bemore favored over bankswhen the costs of public
monitoring are lower or when public monitoring is culturally palatable.
Institutional and cultural factors that lower transaction costs may or
may not positively resonatewith factors that assuage publicmonitoring.
Factors that lower transaction costs or make public monitoring morePlease cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
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are particularly useful to inspect in order to answer the question of
which channel, transaction costs or monitoring, is most inﬂuential in
determining debt structure. In Table 1 we brieﬂy outline our expecta-
tions regarding the impact on debt structure of the institutional and cul-
tural variables used in our empirical investigations, depending on
whether the channel is transaction costs or monitoring.
Examining Table 1, we see a few variables that conﬂictwith expecta-
tions, depending on whether one is considering a transaction cost or
monitoring explanation. Individualism and uncertainty avoidance con-
ﬂict among the cultural dimensions. From a transaction cost perspec-
tive, individualism (uncertainty avoidance) acts in favor of (against)
bonds over banks; from a monitoring perspective, individualism (un-
certainty avoidance) acts against (in favor of) bonds over banks. Simi-
larly, there is conﬂict among the institutional dimensions. From a
transaction cost perspective, limits to legal protection and political in-
stability favor banks; from a monitoring perspective they favor bonds.
An examination of the signs and signiﬁcance of these variables from
our empirical investigation will be of informationally insightful.
3. Methodology
3.1. Statistical speciﬁcation and dependent variable
Initial empirical models and their estimates are based on the follow-
ing equation:
Wi ¼ α1 þ
X
β1i ∗Xi þ
X
β2i ∗Yi þ
X
β3i ∗Zi þ εi ð1Þ
whereWi is a measure of the size of the private bond market to the size
of banking system in the country, Xi is a vector of national institutional
variables, Yi is a vector of national culture variables, while Zi is a vector
of control variables, mainly macroeconomic factors. These control vari-
ables are described in the next section.We limit the countries in our sam-
ple to those emerging markets included by Karolyi (2015). Our sample
period is 2000–2013, with a total of 21 countries and 241 country/year
observations. Based on Breusch and Pagan (1980) tests, we report ordi-
nary least squares (OLS) regression results.3 We cluster standard errors
by country.We include dummy variables to control for year ﬁxed effects.
Using data from the World Bank's Global Financial Development
Database, we form our dependent variable as the ratio of bond market
capitalization of private corporations to the size of domestic assets of
deposit money banks. We refer to this variable as DEBT_STRUCTURE.
Table 2 shows the country averages ranked according to the measure
of bonds versus banks. Examining Table 2, we ﬁnd that debt structure
varies widely across our sample of 21 countries, with a high of 85.19
forMexico and a lowof 1.10 for Turkey. Table 2 also displays the country
values for Karolyi (2015) six institutional dimensions and the six na-
tional culture dimensions of Hofstede et al. (2010).
3.2. Independent variables
3.2.1. Institutional and cultural variables
Our study focuses on independent variables that can be classiﬁed as
national institutional characteristics and national cultural dimensions.
To capture the institutional quality of each emerging market, we
employ Karolyi (2015) six emerging market dimensions: 1) market ca-
pacity constraints (POOR_CAPACITY), 2) operational inefﬁciencies
(POOR_OPERATION), 3) foreign accessibility restrictions (FOREIGN_
RESTRICTIONS), 4) corporate opacity (CORPORATE_OPACITY), 5) limitstructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
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Table 1
Theoretical framework regarding institutional and cultural dimensions, and impact on debt structure through channels of transaction costs and public monitoring.
Panel 1: institutions, transaction costs, and public monitoring
Institutional-quality dimension Transaction costs Public monitoring Empirical result
in this study
Limits on market capacity No expectation from a transaction cost or monitoring perspective Insigniﬁcant
Operational inefﬁciency Transactions costs is inherent component of poor
operations. (Expected sign:−)
No expectation +
Restrictions on foreign investment No expectation from a transaction cost or monitoring perspective −
Corporate opacity Opacity raises transactions cost by increasing costs of
resolving asymmetric information. (Expected sign:−)
Opacity associated with less public monitoring. (Expected
sign:−)
−
Limits on legal protection Poor legal recourse raises transactions costs as it
undermines trust. More asymmetric information needs
to be resolved. (Expected sign:−)
Less recourse concomitant with more comfort with public
monitoring. Less consequences to unfavorable monitoring.
(Expected sign: +)
+
Political instability Less consistency of governance raises transactions costs
as it undermines trust. More asymmetric information
needs to be resolved. (Expected sign:−)
Less consistency of governance concomitant with more
comfort with public monitoring. Less certainty of
consequences to unfavorable monitoring. (Expected sign: +)
+
Panel 2: culture, transaction costs, and public monitoring
Cultural dimension Transaction costs Public monitoring Empirical result
Uncertainty avoidance Greater uncertainty avoidance requires greater effort to resolve
the asymmetric information inherent in market contracts.
Transactions costs will increase. (Expected sign:−)
Low uncertainty avoidance concomitant with fewer rules and
norms governing behavior than high uncertainty avoiding cultures.
High UAI more intolerant of deviant behavior. Lack of toleration of
ambiguity favors public monitoring. (Expected sign: +)
+
Individualism versus
collectivism
Greater individualism associated with greater conﬁdence.
Consequently, less effort invested in resolving the asymmetric
information inherent in market contracts. Transaction costs will
decrease. (Expected sign: +)
Individualism associated with need to sustain self-construal,
and more self-monitoring. Cultures high on individualism focus
on the self, not others. Individualist cultures prefer ability to
self-monitor rather than standards of public monitoring.
(Expected sign:−)
−
Power distance Greater power distance creates greater social fractionalization
which lowers social trust. This increases transactions costs as
greater effort needed to resolve asymmetric information when
trust is lessened. (Expected sign:−)
Greater social hierarchy will lead to exclusion of information
and poorer transparency. (Expected sign:−)
Insigniﬁcant
Masculinity Greater conﬁdence associated with less transaction costs.
(Expected sign: +)
More masculine societies would be more concerned with the
position of one entity versus another; so inclined to disclose
more information about its ﬁnancial position and performance
to enable comparisons. Alternatively, competition engenders
distortion of truth. (Expected sign: Unclear)
+
Long-term orientation Long-term orientation will engender trust and so lower
transaction costs. (Expected sign: +)
Greater long-term orientation, associated with lesser need for
short-term obfuscation. Comfortable with public monitoring.
(Expected sign: +)
+
Indulgence versus
restraint
A looser attitude may have a lowering effect on need to resolve
asymmetric information and so lower transaction costs.
(Expected sign: +)
Hofstede associates indulgence versus restraint with greater
inclination for free speech. More comfort with public disclosure.
(Expected sign: +)
+
This table outlines a summary of our theoretical framework regarding the impact of institutional and cultural variables on debt structure through alternative transaction costs and mon-
itoring channels. The sign of association of our empirical results estimated in Tables 5 and 6 is also shown.
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(POLITICAL_UNSTABLE). To assess the impact of culture on debt
structure, we include as independent variables the six cultural dimen-
sions of Hofstede et al. (2010): uncertainty avoidance (UAI), individ-
ualism versus collectivism (IDV), power distance (PDI), masculinity or
gender differentiation (MAS), indulgence versus restraint (IVR), and
long-term orientation (LTOWVS). As noted above, Kirkman et al.
(2006) have noted the enormously widespread use of Hofstede's cul-
tural dimensions. We have already discussed these variables above
regarding our expectations of the impact of institutions and culture
on transaction costs and the predilection for public monitoring.
3.2.2. Other control variables
Other control variables include the natural log of the GDP per capita
(LNGDPCAP), as well as the one-period lag in the growth in GDP per
capita. We include this second variable to control for economy-wide ﬁ-
nancial distress that could inﬂuence decisions about public versus pri-
vate monitoring. Similarly, we include a country-wide measure of
leverage (LEVERAGE), which is the total of private domestic bonds
plus bank size divided by stock market capitalization from the World
Bank's 2015 Global Financial Development Database. We also include
a measure of the soundness of banks, that is, the annual Z-score of
banks from theWorld Bank's 2015 Global Financial Development Data-
base (ZSCORE). Lastly, we include a measure of how the respectivePlease cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016business community feels about the ease of obtaining a bank loan
(EASE_LOAN). This variable is obtained from the annual ExecutiveOpin-
ion Survey of World Economic Forum. Table 3 provides the summary of
the dependent and independent variables used in this study.
3.3. Hypotheses
Based on our literature review and theoretical framework, we form
two mutually exclusive hypotheses.
H1. Transaction costs are signiﬁcant drivers of debt structure, as evi-
denced by the concomitant negative signiﬁcance of limits to legal pro-
tection and political instability; positive signiﬁcance of individualism,
and negative signiﬁcance of uncertainty avoidance.
H2. The costs ofmonitoring and attitudes toward publicmonitoring are
signiﬁcant drivers of debt structure, as evidenced by the concomitant
positive signiﬁcance of limits to legal protection and political instability;
negative signiﬁcance of individualism, and positive signiﬁcance of un-
certainty avoidance.
These hypotheses reﬂect our discussion above, that the signs of
POOR_LEGAL, POLITICAL_UNSTABLE, IDV, and UAI will differ depending
onwhether the primary driver of DEBT_STRUCTURE is transaction costs
or public monitoring.tructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
Table 2
Country average levels of domestic bond ﬁnancing versus bank ﬁnancing, Karolyi institutional-quality dimensions, and Hofstede cultural dimensions.
COUNTRY DEBT_STRUCTURE Dimensions of institutional quality National culture dimensions
POOR
OPERATION
POOR
CAPACITY
FOREIGN
RESTRICTIONS
CORPORATE
OPACITY
POOR
LEGAL
POLITICAL
UNSTABLE
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR
1 Mexico 85.19 17 4 2 11 14 12 82 30 81 69 24 97
2 Korea 70.00 3 1 8 1 7 6 85 18 60 39 100 29
3 Chile 54.38 5 20 11 3 12 1 86 23 63 28 31 68
4 Peru 49.90 16 7 14 8 9 14 87 16 64 42 25 46
5 Brazil 46.67 7 10 4 6 17 9 76 38 69 49 44 59
6 Malaysia 45.80 1 5 10 4 1 8 36 26 100 50 41 57
7 Argentina 45.31 21 19 16 7 20 19 86 46 49 56 20 62
8 Thailand 30.46 4 6 12 10 4 15 64 20 64 34 32 45
9 South Africa 24.07 2 14 7 5 2 10 49 65 49 63 34 63
10 Czech 19.90 19 15 9 14 13 2 74 58 57 57 70 29
11 China 19.20 6 11 15 21 16 21 30 20 80 66 87 24
12 Indonesia 18.92 14 17 19 17 11 16 48 14 78 46 62 38
13 Russia 11.86 9 21 20 19 19 20 95 39 93 36 81 20
14 Hungary 11.41 15 3 3 15 18 7 82 80 46 88 58 31
15 Slovakia 9.54 20 13 6 13 15 4 51 52 100 100 77 28
16 Slovenia 7.59 18 2 5 2 6 3 88 27 71 19 49 48
17 India 4.89 10 9 18 9 5 17 40 48 77 56 51 26
18 Philippines 2.98 8 12 21 16 21 18 44 32 94 64 27 42
19 Poland 1.71 13 8 1 12 8 5 93 60 68 64 38 29
20 Colombia 1.39 12 16 17 20 3 13 80 13 67 64 13 83
21 Turkey 1.10 11 18 13 18 10 11 85 37 66 45 46 49
This table displays country-level averages for debt structure. This is for period 2000–2013. DEBT_STRUCTURE is the ratio of size of private domestic bonds to size of banks fromWorld
Bank's 2015 Global Financial Development Database. Also shown are the country values for the six dimensions of institutional quality of Karolyi (2015) and the six dimensions of national
culture of Hofstede et al. (2010).
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4.1. Bivariate correlations
The results of bivariate correlations between debt structure and cul-
tural and institutional variables are presented in Table 4. We see that
the simple bivariate correlations with DEBT_STRUCTURE that are
signiﬁcant are UAI (+) IDV (−), PDI (−), MAS (−), IVR (+), POOR_
OPERATION (−), FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS (−), CORPORATE_OPACITY
(−), and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE (−). However, in later multiple regres-
sion models and structural equation models, we evidence associationsTable 3
Summary statistics and data sources.
Variable Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Obs. Source
DEBT_STRUCTURE 28.70 26.52 0.04 106.94 241 Ratio of size of priv
Development Data
POOR_CAPACITY 10.49 6.11 1.00 21.00 241 Formed from meas
POOR_OPERATION 10.56 5.81 1.00 21.00 241 Derived from Karo
FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS 11.43 6.05 1.00 21.00 241 Derived from Karo
CORPORATE_OPACITY 10.83 6.15 1.00 21.00 241 Derived from Karo
POOR_LEGAL 10.50 6.28 1.00 21.00 241 Derived from Karo
POLITICAL_UNSTABLE 11.83 5.72 1.00 21.00 241 Derived from Karo
UAI 67.42 20.95 30.00 95.00 241 Uncertainty Avoida
IDV 33.61 17.06 13.00 80.00 241 Individualism, from
PDI 71.83 15.05 46.00 100.00 241 Power Distance, fro
MAS 53.15 16.23 19.00 100.00 241 Masculinity, from H
LTOWVS 46.85 24.16 13.00 100.00 241 Long-Term Orienta
IVR 47.85 20.40 24.00 97.00 241 Indulgence versus
L.GDPCAPGR 3.58 3.70 −11.73 13.60 241 One period lag in G
LNGDPCAP 8.46 0.92 6.36 10.08 241 Natural log of GDP
ZSCORE 14.55 10.70 −4.73 62.91 241 Average Z score of
EASE_LOAN 3.30 0.67 1.69 4.78 241 How easy is it to o
[1 = very difﬁcult;
LEVERAGE 158.52 151.97 30.11 1131.81 241 Total of private dom
Global Financial De
INTERNATIONAL_BONDS 4.89 4.02 0.02 17.18 241 Size of private inte
Development Data
INF_TRANSPARENCY 70.27 7.52 48.00 85.00 241 Information transp
ACCT_TRANSPARENCY 54.15 11.71 23.00 74.00 241 Accounting transp
This table lists the mean, standard deviations, minimum and maximum; and sources of variab
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International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016that differ in signs and signiﬁcance of these bivariate correlations. For
instance, long-term orientation (LTOWVS) and masculinity (MAS) are
consistently positively signiﬁcant in our models, while power distance
(PDI) is not signiﬁcant. We consider that the complex interplay of cul-
ture and institutions in a regression setting inevitably shapes the role of
both cultural and institutional background beyond simple correlations.
4.2. Determinants of debt structure
Table 5 reports the results of OLS regressions using different sets of
independent variables on DEBT_STRUCTURE. All models have varianceate domestic bonds to size of banks from World Bank's 2015 Global Financial
base
ure of Karolyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
lyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
lyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
lyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
lyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
lyi (2015) by ranking countries in sample. Higher number is less efﬁcient
nce, from Hofstede et al. (2010)
Hofstede et al. (2010)
m Hofstede et al. (2010)
ofstede et al. (2010)
tion, from Hofstede et al. (2010)
Restraint, from Hofstede et al. (2010)
DP growth rate fromWorld Bank Development Indicators
per capita fromWorld Bank Development Indicators
banks from World Bank's Global Financial Development Database
btain a bank loan in your country with only a good business plan and no collateral?
7 = very easy], fromWorld Economic Forum, Executive Opinion Survey
estic bonds plus bank size divided by stock market capitalization, fromWorld Bank's
velopment Database
rnational bond issues by corporations to GDP, fromWorld Bank's Global Financial
base.
arency from Williams (2015)
arency fromWilliams (2015)
les used in estimations reported in results tables for 21 countries from 2000 to 2013.
tructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
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Table 4
Bivariate correlation of debt structure with national culture and institutions.
Bivariate correlation with DEBT_STRUCTURE
UAI 0.22***
(0.001)
POOR_CAPACITY −0.08
(0.246)
IDV −0.23***
(0.000)
POOR_OPERATION −0.39***
(0.000)
PDI −0.11*
(0.075)
FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS −0.38***
(0.000)
MAS −0.14**
(0.035)
CORPORATE_OPACITY −0.50***
(0.000)
LTOWVS −0.01
(0.877)
POOR_LEGAL 0.03
(0.694)
IVR 0.39***
(0.000)
POLITICAL_UNSTABLE −0.14**
(0.032)
This table shows bivariate Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for DEBT_STRUCTURE paired
with institutional and cultural variables. Variables are deﬁned in Table 3. P values are re-
ported in parentheses. *, **, *** are level of signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
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multicollinearity is unlikely to be a problem. Model 1 includes Karolyi
(2015) six institutional quality variables, representing operations cost,
foreign access restrictions, corporate opacity, poor market capacity,
limits to legal protection, and political instability. The results of Model
1 are that corporate opacity is negatively signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Table 5
Determinants of debt structure.
Dependent variable: DEBT_STRUCTURE
1 2 3 4 5
POOR_CAPACITY −0.01
(0.991)
−0.23
(0.750)
−0.85
(0.252)
−0.21
(0.546)
POOR_OPERATION −0.52
(0.553)
−0.04
(0.906)
0.53*
(0.094)
0.87*
(0.069)
0.91*
(0.098)
FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS −1.69
(0.135)
−1.81
(0.225)
−1.92**
(0.018)
−2.60***
(0.001)
−2.69***
(0.000)
CORPORATE_OPACITY −2.29***
(0.007)
−2.94***
(0.006)
−3.43***
(0.003)
−3.13***
(0.003)
−3.10***
(0.003)
POOR_LEGAL 0.76
(0.270)
0.89
(0.172)
1.13*
(0.071)
0.93*
(0.053)
0.86*
(0.094)
POLITICAL_UNSTABLE 1.87*
(0.077)
1.70*
(0.056)
3.30**
(0.022)
3.34**
(0.012)
3.31***
(0.008)
UAI 0.20**
(0.019)
0.45**
(0.022)
0.44**
(0.014)
0.42**
(0.028)
IDV −0.62***
(0.004)
−1.00***
(0.000)
−1.14***
(0.000)
−1.15***
(0.000)
PDI −0.10
(0.689)
−0.06
(0.716)
−0.18
(0.343)
−0.19
(0.328)
MAS 0.41**
(0.050)
0.57**
(0.013)
0.59***
(0.008)
0.57***
(0.010)
LTOWVS 0.42***
(0.002)
0.33***
(0.003)
0.31***
(0.004)
0.32***
(0.008)
IVR 0.57***
(0.001)
0.39***
(0.004)
0.27***
(0.000)
0.26***
(0.000)
L.GDPCAPGR −0.86**
(0.035)
−0.47
(0.241)
−0.41
(0.346)
LNGDPCAP 5.86
(0.165)
3.86
(0.231)
3.31
(0.276)
ZSCORE 0.89*
(0.074)
0.89*
(0.065)
0.86*
(0.064)
EASE_LOAN 7.96**
(0.016)
7.61**
(0.016)
7.23**
(0.023)
LEVERAGE −0.01
(0.458)
−0.01
(0.403)
INTERNATIONAL_BONDS 1.48
(0.105)
1.65
(0.110)
INTERCEPT 40.41**
(0.048)
−14.19
(0.168)
−113.16**
(0.037)
−86.64**
(0.044)
−78.64**
(0.045)
Observations 241 241 241 241 241
R-square 0.43 0.69 0.76 0.77 0.77
Table shows results of pooled regressions with standard errors clustered at country level.
Variance inﬂation factors for all variables in allmodels is less than 10. Variables are deﬁned
in Table 3. P values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** are level of signiﬁcance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level respectively. We control for year ﬁxed effects in all the regressions.
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International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016This suggests that more opaque corporations favor ﬁnancing debt
with banks rather than bonds. This result is consistentwith bankﬁnanc-
ing avoiding public monitoring, in keepingwith the notion that bank ﬁ-
nancing helps ﬁrms maintain opacity. Political instability is positively
signiﬁcant at the 10% level. This result is consistent with themonitoring
explanation as well; if we consider that the monitoring of bad quality
ﬁrms is less costly when there is less governance. The R-square value
of 43%, suggest that institutional quality plays a large role in determin-
ing bond versus bank ﬁnancing.
Model 2 adds Hofstede's six cultural dimensions to the independent
variables. The results in CORPORATE_OPACITY again being negatively
signiﬁcant and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE is again positively signiﬁcant.
With regard to the cultural variables, long-term orientation, indulgence,
uncertainty avoidance, andmasculinity are all positively signiﬁcant. Indi-
vidualism is negatively signiﬁcant. The R-squared value is now over 69%,
suggesting culture is a very important determinant of debt structure.
Model 3 adds macroeconomic variables, i.e. the natural log of the
GDP per capita and a one-period lag in the GDP per capita growth to
the set of independent variables. It also adds the average Z-score for
banks as a measure of bank soundness and a measure of the ease of
obtaining loan ﬁnancing from a bank. This results in EASE_LOAN being
positively signiﬁcant at the 5% level and lagged GDP per capita growth
being negatively signiﬁcant. This ﬁnding is consistent with greater ﬁ-
nancial distress leading to less enthusiasm for public monitoring. The
measure of bank soundness, ZSCORE, is positively signiﬁcant, suggesting
that a preference for bonds over banks is not driven by the relative
soundness of banks. Other variables have generally the same signs and
signiﬁcance as in Model 2. An exception is POOR_LEGAL, which is now
positively signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
Model 4 adds measures of leverage and the extent of use of interna-
tional bonds by ﬁrms. These additional variables are not signiﬁcant and
make little difference in the signs and signiﬁcance of the other variables.
An exception is that the one-period lag in the GDP per capita growth
is now not signiﬁcant. As a robustness check, Model 5 removes
POOR_CAPACITY from the set of independent variables. We do this
out of concern that this measure of Karolyi (2015) incorporates the ex-
tent and health of the bond market. Excluding POOR_CAPACITY makes
little difference to the signs and signiﬁcance of the other variables.
4.3. Discussion of initial results
In our hypothesis section, we suggest that a transaction cost expla-
nation of debt structure is supported by the concomitant negative sig-
niﬁcance of limits to legal protection and political instability, the
positive signiﬁcance of individualism, and the negative signiﬁcance of
uncertainty avoidance (H1). Alternatively, we suggest the costs of mon-
itoring and attitudes toward public monitoring are supported by the
concomitant positive signiﬁcance of limits to legal protection and polit-
ical instability, the negative signiﬁcance of individualism, and the posi-
tive signiﬁcance of uncertainty avoidance (H2).
The results of Table 5 strongly support H2 and offer no support for H1
whatsoever. The variable IDV (UAI) is signiﬁcantly negative (positive) in
every model. The variables POOR_LEGAL and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE are
positively signiﬁcant in the more comprehensive models. The combina-
tions of the signs and signiﬁcance of these variables are consistent with
amonitoring explanation of debt structure, as discussed above. Addition-
ally, the signs and signiﬁcance of the other independent variables are
consistent with a monitoring explanation, particularly the positive sig-
niﬁcance of LTOWVS and IVR. The marginal positive signiﬁcance of
POOR_OPERATIONS is sharply inconsistent with a transaction cost
explanation.
4.4. Structural-equation modeling
In this section, we present the results of structural equation model-
ing. These equations accounts for the fact that culture could have atructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
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and reduce multicollinearity, we test a model of structural equations.
In addition to the primary regression model of Eq. (1), we regress
each measure of institutional quality on the cultural dimensions of
Hofstede et al. (2010) i.e. PDI, MAS, IDV, UAI, LTOWVS, and IVR accord-
ing to the following equation:
Institutional Variablei ¼ α0 þ β1UAIi þ β2IDVi þ β3PDIi þ β4MASi
þ β5LTOWVSi þ β6IVRi þ εi ð2Þ
We repeat this regression for all the six Karolyi (2015) emerging
market dimensions across 21 countries, i.e. POOR_CAPACITY,
POOR_OPERATION, FOREIGN_RESTRICTION, CORPORATE_OPACITY,
POOR_LEGAL, and POLITICALLY_UNSTABLE. Our primary equation
with DEBT_STRUCTURE as the dependent variable uses the same set of
independent variables as in Model 4 of Table 5.4 We employ the follow-
ing set of equations:
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →POOR CAPACITY ð3aÞ
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →POOR OPERATION ð3bÞ
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →FOREIGN RESTRICTIONS ð3cÞ
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →CORPORATE OPACITY ð3dÞ
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →POOR LEGAL ð3eÞ
UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR →POLITICAL UNSTABLE ð3fÞ
POOR CAPACITY POOR OPRATION FOREIGN RESTRICTIONS
CORPORATE OPACITY POOR LEGAL
POLITICAL UNSTABLE UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR L:GDPCAPGR
LNGDPCAP ZSCORE EASE LOANLEVERAGE INTERNATIONA BONDS
→ DEBT STRUCTURE ð3gÞ
The results of structural-equation analysis are that POOR_OPERATION,
POOR_LEGAL, and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE are positively signiﬁcant in
determining DEBT_STRUCTURE, while CORPORATE_OPACITY and
FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS are negatively signiﬁcant. With regard to the
cultural variables, UAI, MAS, LTOWVS, and IVR are positively signiﬁcant,
while IDV is negatively signiﬁcant. Comparing our results of structural-
equation modeling in Table 6 with the results of Table 5, there are few
if any differences with regard to the signiﬁcance and concomitant signs
of the institutional and cultural variables. Thisﬁnding suggests our results
for the impact of institutional quality and culture onDEBT_STRUCTURE in
Table 5 are robust to the consideration of culture's impact on institutions.
In Table 6, we further afﬁrm a monitoring explanation for debt
structure, since, even when controlling for the impact of culture on
institutions, our results of the negative signiﬁcance of IDV and positive
signiﬁcance of UAI, POOR_LEGAL, and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE support
H2.
4.5. Discussion
We have suggested two possible channels for what determines the
ratio of bonds to bank ﬁnancing in emerging markets. The ﬁrst is a
transaction-cost perspective. This view is similar to that of other papers
that have examined stock market ﬁnancing versus banks (Aggarwal &4 Following Chin (1998), we consider that structured equation modeling, unlike an in-
strumented variable approach allows for simultaneous analysis of all the variables in the
model instead of each variable being considered separately. Additionally, in structured
equation modeling approach measurement error is not aggregated in a residual error
term.
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Tadesse, 2006). The channeling of funds from savers to investors, or ﬁ-
nancial intermediation, is a necessary function in all countries and is
generally undertaken primarily through ﬁnancial institutions or
through ﬁnancial markets. Financing channels must resolve the issues
of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and agency costs in-
volved in ﬁnancing contracts that cover the monitoring and collection
of funds provided by savers to investors. Given that all optimal contracts
are incomplete, the efﬁcacy and efﬁciency of overcoming these
contracting costs depend not only on explicit transaction costs but
also on the implicit cost of the need for more vetting and information
gathering in environments of less institutional integrity or in cultures
more averse to uncertainty or less trust.
Alternatively, we have suggested a monitoring explanation. In this
view, the predilection for debt ﬁnancing as bonds over banks is domi-
nated by bondﬁnancing being favored over bankﬁnancingwhen public
monitoring is more comfortable or less uncomfortable for various insti-
tutional and cultural reasons. Table 1 highlights our theoretical frame-
work; identifying particular factors that we posit are signiﬁcant but
have differing signs of association depending on a transaction cost or
monitoring explanation.
Overall, we ﬁnd robust support for a monitoring explanation of debt
structure in emergingmarkets. In particular, we identify two institution-
al variables, limits on legal protection and political instability, forwhich a
monitoring explanation would suggest a positively signiﬁcant associa-
tion with debt structure and a transaction cost explanation would sug-
gest a negative association. We consistently ﬁnd positive signiﬁcance
for limits to legal protection andpolitical instability using various estima-
tion procedures, supporting a public monitoring explanation.
Similarly, we identify in particular two cultural variables whose
signs of association differ depending on a monitoring or a transaction
cost explanation. For a monitoring explanation, we expect debt
structure to have a negative association with individualism and a posi-
tive association with uncertainty avoidance; for a transaction-cost ex-
planation, we would expect a positive association with individualism
and a negative association with uncertainty avoidance. We consistently
ﬁnda positive signiﬁcance for limits to uncertainty avoidance and a neg-
ative signiﬁcance for individualism, using various estimation proce-
dures, again supporting a monitoring explanation. As a robustness
check,we also conﬁrm our resultswith an alternativemeasure of gover-
nance. Additionally, our control variables for bank soundness (ZSCORE)
and ease of obtaining a bank loan (EASE_LOAN) are positively signiﬁ-
cant. This ﬁnding suggests that our results are not driven by the ﬁnan-
cially distressed banking structure or difﬁculty in obtaining bank
ﬁnancing in the respective countries.
It is important to also discuss our results within a context of liquidity
concerns as an explanation, since liquidity concerns have been often put
forward as a cause of preference for bonds versus bank debt ﬁnancing
(e.g., Cantillo & Wright, 2000; Johnson, 1997; Khwaja & Mian, 2008).
However, it should also be noted that there is mixed empirical support
for whether it is banks or bonds that are favored during liquidity shocks
(see Davydov & Vähämaa, 2013). Khwaja andMian (2008) suggest that
during liquidity shocks, banks pass on liquidity constraints to ﬁrms,
largely because they are better able to issue new equities than new de-
posits. Khwaja and Mian (2008) however ﬁnd, for the case of Pakistan,
that larger ﬁrms, when banks constrict credit, are able to shift debt ﬁ-
nancing to bond ﬁnancing. Following the argument of Khwaja and
Mian (2008) we might expect bonds to be favored over banks during
times of ﬁnancial downturns. However, we ﬁnd a positive association
of bonds versus banks with the ease of getting a loan (EASE_LOAN).
This result is inconsistent with liquidity shocks driving a move to
bonds. On the other hand, Cantillo and Wright (2000) and others sug-
gest that bank debt is more easily restructured during liquidity con-
straints. This would suggest, contra to Khwaja and Mian (2008), that
banks are favored over bonds during economic downturns. However,
we ﬁnd little signiﬁcant association of debt structure with the one-tructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
Table 6
Determinants of debt structure: structural-equation modeling.
DEBT_STRUCTURE POOR_CAPACITY POOR_OPERATION FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS CORPORATE_OPACITY POOR_LEGAL POLITICAL_UNSTABLE
POOR_CAPACITY −0.18
(0.502)
POOR_OPERATION 0.80***
(0.009)
FOREIGN_RESTRICTIONS −2.44***
(0.000)
CORPORATE_OPACITY −3.14***
(0.000)
POOR_LEGAL 0.93***
(0.000)
POLITICAL_UNSTABLE 3.26***
(0.000)
UAI 0.38***
(0.000)
0.19***
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.977)
−0.07***
(0.000)
0.05***
(0.006)
0.13***
(0.000)
−0.07***
(0.000)
IDV −1.12***
(0.000)
−0.04*
(0.085)
0.02
(0.541)
−0.19***
(0.000)
−0.18***
(0.000)
−0.01
(0.848)
−0.16***
(0.000)
PDI −0.14
(0.110)
0.03
(0.302)
−0.02***
(0.544)
−0.02
(0.497)
0.03
(0.221)
0.10***
(0.000)
−0.03
(0.183)
MAS 0.61***
(0.000)
0.18***
(0.000)
0.04
(0.150)
0.03
(0.137)
0.27***
(0.000)
0.16***
(0.000)
0.09***
(0.000)
LTOWVS 0.28***
(0.001)
−0.08***
(0.000)
−0.06***
(0.013)
−0.15***
(0.000)
−0.07***
(0.000)
−0.00
(0.995)
−0.11***
(0.000)
IVR 0.24**
(0.047)
−0.09***
(0.000)
−0.05*
(0.074)
−0.22***
(0.000)
−0.16***
(0.000)
−0.08***
(0.003)
−0.14***
(0.000)
L.GDPCAPGR −0.22
(0.457)
LNGDPCAP 6.30**
(0.026)
ZSCORE 0.81***
(0.000)
EASE_LOAN 7.02***
(0.002)
LEVERAGE −0.01
(0.126)
INTERNATIONAL_BONDS 1.21***
(0.003)
INTERCEPT −90.41***
(0.001)
−3.88
(0.249)
14.12***
(0.000)
39.11***
(0.000)
7.72**
(0.020)
−9.34**
(0.014)
31.12***
(0.000)
LR Chi-square 1250.86***
(0.000)
This table reports results for structural-equation modeling deﬁned in Eqs. (2) and (3a)–(3g). Variables are deﬁned in Table 3. P values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** are level of
signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Results are reported for 241 observations. We control for year ﬁxed effects in all the regressions.
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signiﬁcance of L.GDPCAPGR inModel 3 of Table 5, whichwould suggest,
contra Cantillo andWright (2000), that economic upturns lead to a shift
to bank ﬁnancing.
Consideration of a liquidity explanation for our results can also be
approached by examining the results for our cultural variables. We
ﬁnd a positive association of uncertainty avoidance and a preference
for bonds over banks. This result is interesting in comparison with the
results of Ramirez and Tadesse (2009) with regard to the association
of national culture with cash holdings. Ramirez and Tadesse (2009)
ﬁnd ﬁrms in more uncertainty-avoiding cultures hold more cash as a
percent of assets. Thiswould suggest a positive association of uncertain-
ty avoidance and a preference for liquidity. Viewing this result alongside
our result of a positive association of uncertainty avoidance and a pref-
erence for bonds over bankswould suggest that bonds aremore favored
when liquidity ismore desired. On the other hand, we ﬁnd a positive as-
sociation of bonds versus banks and long-term orientation. Under the
assumption that liquidity is less required in environments of more
long-term orientation, this would suggest bonds are favored when li-
quidity is less needed. Overall our results for the signs and signiﬁcances
of national culture variables on debt structure conﬂict with regard to a
liquidity interpretation.
Taking together 1) themixed empirical evidence of prior literature re-
garding the association of debt structure and the need for liquidity, 2) the
positive signiﬁcance of the ease of obtaining a loan and the little or no sig-
niﬁcance of the ﬁrst lag of GDP per capita growth, and 3) the positive andPlease cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016signiﬁcant coefﬁcients on uncertainty avoidance and long-term orienta-
tion, we conclude that our results are not driven by an association of
debt structure with changes in liquidity. We also note in this regard
that examining the results of Table 5, national culture and institutional
variables alone explain 69% or the variance in debt structure.
5. Alternative proxy for governance
As a robustness check, we replace Karolyi (2015) dimensions of
institutional quality with Williams (2015) two measures of overall
national governance. Like Karolyi (2015), Williams (2015) employs a
principal component approach to generate cross-national comparison
of institutional quality. Williams (2015) generates two indices of
transparency that estimate cross-national differences in reporting
transparency and governance accountability (INF_TRANSPARENCY
and ACCT_TRANSPARENCY). The results of this modeling, shown in
Table 7, are that, as in the other tables, DEBT_STRUCTURE is negatively
related to the quality of governance. Additionally, there is little change
in the signiﬁcance of culture in shaping this relation. The variables
UAI, LTOWVS, and IVR are again positively signiﬁcant and IDV is again
negatively signiﬁcant. A difference from Table 6 is that MAS is no longer
signiﬁcant but PDI is negatively signiﬁcant.
Overall, the results of replacing our primary measure of institutional
quality, from Karolyi (2015) six dimensions, with Williams (2015) two
transparency dimensions is that we conﬁrm a negative association be-
tween governance and DEBT_STRUCTURE and conﬁrm that nationaltructure in emergingmarkets: Transaction costs or publicmonitoring?,
/j.irfa.2017.07.004
Table 7
Determinants of debt structure: robustness tests with alternative governance measures.
DEBT_STRUCTURE ACCT_TRANSPARENCY INF_TRANSPARENCY
ACCT_TRANSPARENCY −0.36*
(0.058)
INF_TRANSPARENCY −0.95***
(0.001)
UAI 0.34**
(0.011)
0.12***
(0.000)
0.12***
(0.000)
IDV −0.41***
(0.001)
0.24***
(0.000)
0.19***
(0.000)
PDI −0.40***
(0.001)
−0.22***
(0.000)
0.06*
(0.094)
MAS 0.08
(0.516)
−0.06
(0.172)
−0.07**
(0.025)
LTOWVS 0.25**
(0.043)
−0.07*
(0.058)
0.01
(0.763)
IVR 0.60***
(0.000)
0.00
(0.998)
0.08***
(0.009)
L.GDPCAPGR 0.27
(0.512)
LNGDPCAP 8.12**
(0.050)
ZSCORE 0.61***
(0.000)
EASE_LOAN 1.69
(0.491)
LEVERAGE −0.00
(0.944)
INTERNATIONAL_BONDS 2.70***
(0.003)
INTERCEPT −7.47
(0.719)
60.01***
(0.000)
51.22***
(0.000)
LR Chi-square 308.70***
(0.000)
This table reports the results of structural-equationmodeling. Variables are deﬁned in Table 3. P values are reported in parentheses. *, **, *** are level of signiﬁcance at 10%, 5% and 1% level
respectively. Results are reported for 241 observations. We control for year ﬁxed effects in all the regressions. Models used in this table are:
• UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR→ ACCT_TRANSPARENCY
• UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR→ INF_TRANSPARENCY
• ACCT_TRANSPARENCY INF_TRANSPARENCY UAI IDV PDI MAS LTOWVS IVR L.GDPCAPGR LNGDPCAP ZSCORE EASE_LOAN LEVERAGE INTERNATIONAL_BONDS→ DEBT_STRUCTURE
10 J.W. Goodell, A. Goyal / International Review of Financial Analysis xxx (2017) xxx–xxxculture is very important in shaping this relation. Especially, we conﬁrm
our support for H2 in light of an alternative measure of national gover-
nance. The negative signiﬁcance of INF_TRANSPARENCY and
ACCT_TRANSPARENCY corresponds to the positive signiﬁcance of
POOR_LEGAL and POLITICAL_UNSTABLE in Tables 5 and 6. The variable
IDV is again negatively signiﬁcant andUAI is positively signiﬁcant. Over-
all, the robustness test of replacing Karolyi (2015) institutional quality
measures with Williams (2015) governance dimensions is evidence
that our support for the monitoring explanation of debt structure (H2)
is not dependent on the use of Karolyi (2015) dimensions.
6. Conclusions
Bond market development is integral to the ﬁnancial development
of emerging markets. Further, the choice between bond market ﬁnanc-
ing and bank ﬁnancing is an important element in a nation's ﬁnancial
picture. However, little research has investigated the institutional and
cultural determinants of the choice between bond and bank ﬁnancing.
Recent research has investigated the cultural and institutional determi-
nants of bank versus market ﬁnancing. However, less literature has fo-
cused on the determinants of bond versus bank ﬁnancing and even
less on emerging markets while comprehensively controlling for insti-
tutional quality and national culture.
Our research design has attempted to account for both institutional
quality and national culture, considering their interplay, especially the
role of culture in shaping institutions. We highlight a theoretical frame-
work that identiﬁes several institutional and cultural variables whose
signs of association with a predilection for private bonds over bank
ﬁnancing (debt structure) differ depending on a monitoring or a trans-
action cost-based explanation. Employing several tests, includingPlease cite this article as: Goodell, J.W., &Goyal, A.,What determines debt s
International Review of Financial Analysis (2017), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016structural-equation modeling, we ﬁnd, among many results, that, in
emerging markets, bonds are preferred over banks when there are
less corporate opacity and fewer foreign access restrictions, as well as
in environments of greater political instability, transactions costs, and
limits to legal protection. Bonds are also favored over banks in cultural
environment of greater uncertainty avoidance, masculinity, long-term
orientation, indulgence and less individualism.
Overall, we interpret our results as endorsing a monitoring explana-
tion. Bonds being more favored in environments of less national gover-
nance is consistent with less institutional development leading to less
costly consequences from unfavorable public monitoring. Our results,
using a new measure of dimensions of institutional quality (Karolyi,
2015), suggest that the traditional story of institutional development
and market development co-moving closely (e.g., Acemoglu &
Johnson, 2005; Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Beck & Levine, 2005;
Claessens & Laeven, 2003)may actually be farmore nuanced for private
bond markets, particularly for emerging markets. Our results will be of
great interest to researchers interested in the legal, social, and cultural
environments of emerging markets.
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